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Abstract
We address the questions of disinvestment (partial privatization)
and entry in the context of quantity competition between a partially
privatized public bank and a private bank. We find that social welfare
improves with entry only when the private banks are more efficient
than the public bank. We also determine socially optimum degree of
disinvestment and entry.
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1 Introduction
Partial government ownership of banks is a common phenomena all over the
world. In a study covering 92 countries, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and
Shleifer (2000) found that “in an average country, 42 percent of equity of
the 10 largest banks was still owned by the government in 1995”. This is
especially true for transition economies where nationalized banks are grad-
ually being privatized. To give an example, in India, the government has
expressed its intention to bring down its holding in public sector banks to 33
per cent through gradual privatization (or ‘disinvestment’) and the process
is underway. Moreover, although new banks have been entering the Indian
banking industry, entry is strictly monitored and controlled by the govern-
ment. Such a situation indicates the presence of not too many banks in the
industry which results in imperfect competition between them. As a result, it
is reasonable to expect elements of strategic behaviour among the competing
banks.
Surprisingly, there is a paucity of models analyzing strategic interactions
between partially nationalized firms and private competitors. The growing
body of mixed oligopoly models1 considers either fully privatized or fully
nationalized firms. Therefore, the issues of partial privatization (henceforth
disinvestment) and entry deregulation have not been given due recognition.
The central concern of this paper is to fill this lacuna, with reference to the
banking industry.
Closely related to our work are three papers, viz. Purroy and Salas (2000),
Matsumura(1998) and Fershtman (1990). Purroy and Salas (2000) study
competition between a savings institution 2 and a profit maximizing private
1Bos (1991) contains an exhaustive discussion of the issues.
2A savings institution is akin to a workers’ cooperative and it exhibits ‘expense pref-
2
bank. They show that the savings institution outperforms the private bank
in terms of deposit collection and profit. The private bank can partly restore
the asymmetry by offering managerial incentives (as in Fershtman and Judd,
1987).3 While the savings institution bears some resemblance to a public
sector bank, their model is not useful to address the question of disinvest-
ment. The question of entry is also ignored. We address both these issues in
this paper.
Matsumura (1998) on the other hand, though ignoring the issue of entry,
directly deals with the question of optimal disinvestment. He shows that
mixed ownership is an optimal situation compared to full nationalization or
full privatization. However his result depends on the specification that the
government is consumer surplus oriented4 and the objective of the partially
privatized firm is to maximize a weighted average of its profit and the gov-
ernment’s utility.5 In contrast, we consider the government’s objective to be
profit oriented since it went for the process of disinvestment with profitability
of the public bank in mind and still we obtain partial privatization of the
public bank as a solution. Moreover, we show that social optimum requires
deregulation of entry accompanied by partial privatization when entry brings
erence behaviour’, i.e. utility maximization where utility here is the sum of profit and a
positive weight on workers’ wage-bill.
3This is not a surprising result and is in line with the well known Cournot intuition and
the results obtained by Fershtman and Judd (1987). The Cournot intuition says that if a
firm could commit to a strategy that enables it to produce at a higher level than what the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium predicts, e.g. by offering managerial incentives as in Fershtman
and Judd (1987), its profit will be higher.
4The government’s utility is taken as the sum of social welfare and a non-negative
weight on consumer surplus.
5When the government’s objective is profit oriented, mixed ownership is no longer
optimal and the government goes for either full nationalization or full privatization.
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with it efficiency into the industry.
Matsumara’s approach to modelling partially privatized firms is more
conventional and is in line with other mixed oligopoly models, such as De
Fraja and Delbono (1989), Sen and Saha (1992), Pal and White (1998), White
(2001) and Nishimori and Ogawa (2002). De Fraja and Delbono (1989) show
that with one social welfare maximizing firm and n profit maximizing firms,
when the number of firms is sufficiently large, the optimal strategy of the
social welfare maximizing firm is to act as a profit maximizer.6
Fershtman (1990) suggested an alternative approach to modelling a par-
tially privatized firm. Instead of specifying an objective function, he proposed
a special type of reaction function that would suitably describe the behaviour
of a partially privatized firm.7 Though the objective of the firm remains an
open question, his reaction function approach is extremely convenient for
characterizing mixed oligopoly competition. Fershtman shows that the par-
tially privatized firm earns higher profit than if it were privatized when both
firms are equally efficient. When the private firm is more efficient, national-
ization of the partially privatized firm reduces social welfare.8
To address both the issues of disinvestment and entry, we adopt the re-
action function suggested by Fershtman(1990) and endogenously determine
the degree of disinvestment.9 Our premise is that disinvestment of the pub-
6This suggests the possibility of privatization but partial privatization is not considered.
7The reaction function is a weighted average of the reaction functions of a social welfare
maximizing firm and a profit maximizing firm. It is shown that the partly nationalized
firm earns higher profit.
8Further, Fershtman finds that the public characteristic of an incumbent partially pri-
vatized firm serves to deter entry when all firms are equally efficient. However, there will
be entry if the incumbent is sufficiently privatized and consequently, social welfare could
increase.
9The degree of disinvestment is exogenous in Fershtman (1990).
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lic bank is used as a strategy to improve its profit performance. Hence a
reservation level of the public bank’s profit is set as part of the government’s
objective, which otherwise maximizes social welfare.10 While meeting reser-
vation profit, ownership needs to be divested to bring profit orientation in
the public bank’s behaviour. Accordingly optimal disinvestment is deter-
mined. When the number of potential entrants is fixed to begin with, while
greater entry results in higher disinvestment, there is a limit on the number
of private banks that can be allowed in the industry for a given reservation
profit. However, entry deregulation is a suboptimal strategy from the social
welfare point of view, when all banks are equally efficient.11 When private
banks are more efficient than the public bank, their entry leads to more di-
sivestment and also raises social welfare. Thereby, the model can determine
both socially optimal disinvestment and entry. Finally, we study the case of
product differentiation with price competition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
model framework. Section 3 discusses the implications for disinvestment
when the potential number of entrants is exogenously fixed. Section 4 dis-
cusses the optimality of entry deregulation policy with disinvestment. Section
5 presents the case of price competition. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model Framework
We assume that one public bank (represented by subindex 0) and n(≥ 1)
private banks (represented by subindex i, ∀i = 1 to n) can engage in a
10This makes the government profit oriented unlike that in Matsumura (1998).
11This is contrary to Fershtman (1990) where entry increases social welfare if the par-
tially privatized firm is sufficiently privatized, even when both firms are equally efficient.
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Cournot-type quantity competition.12 A typical bank i mobilizes deposits
Di by offering an interest rate r to depositors by the rule
r = bD, b > 0,
whereD =
∑n
0 Di is the total supply of deposits coming from depositors.
All banks face a constant rate of return R on each unit of investment made
out of these deposits.13 It is not very difficult to think of fixed R when
money markets and loan markets are competitive in which case all banks
earn similar rates of return on their investments.
A private bank’s objective is to choose Di so as to maximize profit
Πi = (R− r)Di
Given others’ deposits, the private bank’s deposits are
Di =
R− bD−i
2b
,
which is its reaction function (say, RFi), where D−i =
∑
j 6=iDj
12In India, before the deregulation of interest rates in the nineties, banks were not
free to choose interest rates as they were fixed by the regulator. Even after reforms and
deregulation, some interest rates such as that offered on deposits with low maturities
continue to be fixed by the regulator. In such situations, one can expect banks to compete
in terms of deposit collection by setting targets for deposit mobilization or through setting
up of branches
13Albeit all our results are valid even if R is generalized to be inversely dependent on
D (e.g. when the deposits are loaned out, higher D would increase the total loans which
would reduce the interest rate in the market for loans and hence lower the rate of return on
investments). We can even incorporate a reserve requirement of the central bank (known
as Cash Reserve Ratio in India) whereby banks are required to keep a fraction, say γ
of their reserves as cash with the central bank and the rest, i.e. (1 − γ)D is free to be
invested. In this case the return on unit investment is (1 − γ)R + γr0 (where r0 is the
return paid on cash reserves) which can be redefined as R without affecting the analysis.
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The public bank is partly owned by the government and is partly private.
The decision of how much private participation to allow (i.e. disinvestment)
rests with the government. However the choice of deposits of the public bank
rests with the managers of the bank. The bank’s strategy is a mix of social
welfare maximizing and profit maximizing strategies depending on the degree
of government vis-a-vis private ownership. Next, we separate the objective
of the government from the strategy of the public bank. The government’s
objective is to maximize social welfare subject to a reservation level of the
public bank’s profit and this determines the level of disinvestment that the
government goes for.
Social welfare is given by the sum of depositor surplus (DS) and bank
profits. Therefore
SW = DS +
n∑
0
Πi
where DS = rD − ∫D0 bzdz = rD − bD22
Therefore
SW = (R− bD
2
)D
To maximize social welfare, a pure public (i.e. fully nationalized) bank
would choose Di as
Di =
R− bD−i
b
which is its reaction function (say, R˜Fi).
However, the mixed ownership of the public bank places it in between
the above two extreme situations. Since the bank cannot ignore the interests
of its private shareholders, it cannot be a pure social welfare maximizer. On
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the other hand, by virtue of being a shareholder of the bank, the government
can indirectly influence its activities. Hence the public bank cannot be a
pure profit maximizer. The approaches in the literature towards modelling
the mixed ownership nature of a public firm is divided into two. One way
is to model the mixed ownership through the public firm’s objective fun-
tion. Matsumura (1998) follows this approach by incorporating both social
welfare and profit in the partially privatized public firm’s objective funtion.
The other way is to allow for the mixed ownership to be manifested directly
in the reaction function. Without worrying about the objective of the firm
or the government, Fershtman (1990) follows the second approach by con-
sidering the reaction function of the partly nationalized firm as a weighted
average of the reaction functions of a pure social welfare maximizing firm and
a profit maximizing firm. The raison d’ etre of such a reaction function is
the assumption that “the conflict between the two interest groups is resolved
through a compromise” (Fershtman, 1990). We follow Fershtman’s sugges-
tion of incorporating the conflict in strategies in the reaction function itself,
while also explicitly introducing an objective function of the government.
Therefore, the public bank’s reaction function is a weighted average of
R˜F and RF, where RF is the reaction function from profit maximization
RF ∗0 = θ ˜RF0 + (1− θ)RF0,
where θ ∈ [0, 1]
θ is the degree of nationalization or government control which is positively
linked to the proportion of shares the government holds and (1 − θ) is the
degree of disinvestment. θ is unity if the bank is fully nationalized and zero
if the bank is fully privatized.
Fershtman(1990) however does not discuss the objective of the public firm
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or the government. While a variety of objective functions could be consistent
with the above reaction function, we too desist from discussing the objective
function of the public bank.14 Instead, we introduce an objective function of
the government which serves to determine how much private participation
to be allowed in the public bank. Therefore, we separate the objective of
the government from the strategy of the public bank. The government’s
objective is
Maximize SW
Subject to pi0 ≥ pi0,
where pi0 is a reservation profit.
15
In other words, although the government is a social welfare maximizer,
being a shareholder it would want the public bank to earn a minimum level
of profit, also serving as a profit commitment to facilitate entry.16 The reser-
vation profit can also be interpreted as being a participation constraint of
the private partner which induces him to buy stakes in the public bank. This
objective function that we assign to the government is similar to that in Bos
(1986). The choice of pi0 is a political decision and comes from the ‘profit
orientation’ of the government. We consider a two-stage full information
game where in the first stage, the government chooses θ and n. Given θ and
n, in the second stage, the public bank and the private banks compete for
14Bos and Peters (1989) as cited in Fershtman (1990) contains a detailed discussion on
the objective function of a partly nationalized firm.
15Since disinvestment is done to impart profit behaviour to the public bank, it could
be expected that the government will impose some reservation level of profit even after
partially abdicating control which can be represented as a minimum reservation profit.
16pi0 can be seen as a commitment to some reservation level of profit which signals that
the government will not drive out all potential entrants from the industry by maximizing
social welfare, thereby driving profit to zero.
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deposits.
As a benchmark case, let us first determine optimal disinvestment under
monopoly of the public bank. Note that before disinvestment, the public
bank makes zero profit, whereas its social welfare is at the maximum.17 Now
suppose that government stakes are reduced from unity to θ. Then the
deposits produced is given as
D0 =
(1 + θ)R
2b
= D
This gives social welfare and profit as
SWM =
R2
8b
(3− θ)(1 + θ)
piM0 =
(1− θ2)R2
4b
It is straightforward to check that SW is increasing in θ while pi0 is
decreasing in θ. Hence the optimal θ is determined by the intersection of piM0
and p¯i0
θ∗ =
√
1− 4bpi0
R2
17The maximum social welfare is R
2
b .
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Figure 1: Bank Competition
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The graphical solution is shown in figure 1. Intersection of piM0 and pi0
gives the equilibrium θ.
Notice that, disinvestment rises with ‘profit orientation’ and falls with
the rate of return earned on deposits
∂θ∗
∂pi0
< 0
∂θ∗
∂R
> 0
3 Bank Competition
Now we consider the case where the disinvestment authority decides only on
the extent of disinvestment, taking the existence of a private sector as given.
In other words, the number of private banks is exogenously determined. It
may be imagined that the questions of entry are largely determined by the
government’s overall policy of liberalization, which may not be sector-specific,
though disinvestment may be handled by a more specialized body, which is
indeed the case in reality. Hence we assume that n private banks compete
for deposits with the public bank18 in a Cournot game where all banks have
complete information about the game. We solve the game by backward
induction. First, for given θ and n, the equilibrium deposits are determined.
Next, equilibrium θ is determined. Finally, we obtain an upper limit on n
beyond which the profit constraint of the public bank becomes untenable.
In the presence of n private banks, reaction function of the public bank
18In our setup, coexistence of private banks with a pure public bank is not possible
because simple social welfare maximization by a fully nationalized bank would drive out
all other banks in the absence of any capacity constraint. Hence, n banks cannot exist
beforehand. The public bank has to be disinvested in order to create room for entry.
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is
D0 =
(1 + θ)(R− bD−i)
2b
Private banks simply maximize profit. Therefore, the private banks’ re-
action functions are
Di =
R− bD−i
2b
,∀i = 1, ..., n
Assuming that all the n private banks are identical, the reaction functions
become
D0 =
(1 + θ)(R− bnD1)
2b
(1)
D1 =
R− bD0
(n+ 1)b
,
where D1 refers to a representative private bank’s deposits.
Solving the two reaction functions for D0 and D1
D0 =
(1 + θ)R
[(2 + n(1− θ)]b
D1 =
(1− θ)R
[(2 + n(1− θ)]b
D = D0 + nD1 =
[(1 + θ) + n(1− θ)]R
[(2 + n(1− θ)]b
This results in social welfare and profit as
SW =
R2[3 + n(1− θ)− θ][(1 + θ) + n(1− θ)]
2b[2 + n(1− θ)]2
pi0 =
(1− θ2)R2
[2 + n(1− θ)]2b (2)
pi1 =
(1− θ)2R2
[2 + n(1− θ)]2b
Note that profit of the public bank is higher which is because of the
deviation from Cournot-Nash equilibrium as a result of mixed ownership.19
19This finding is consistent with Fershtman (1990).
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Also note that social welfare decreases with disinvestment as before, but the
public bank’s profit now rises in θ upto a point and then declines. To be more
precise, its profit is a concave function of θ with a maximum at θ = n
n+2
. We
obtain this by differentiating its profit twice with respect to θ as
∂pi0
∂θ
= 0⇒ θ = n
n+ 2
20
∂2pi0
∂θ
= −4R
2[n(n+ 2)(1− θ) + 2]
b[2 + n(1− θ)]4 < 0
The government’s objective remains the same as discussed in the previous
section. Once again, the profit constraint determines the level of disinvest-
ment that the government goes for.21 The graphical solution is given in figure
1. Intersection of pi0 and pi0 gives the equilibrium θ.
Mathematically, the solution is given by
θ∗ =
n(n+ 2) +
√
k[k − 4(n+ 1)]
n2 + k
, (3)
where, k =
R2
bpi0
Note that we choose the higher root since higher θ is preferred to lower θ
because of higher social welfare.
Proposition 1 For a given level of reservation profit p¯i0 (0 < p¯i0 < pi
M
0 ), a
larger scale of entry is associated with a higher degree of disinvestment.
Proof : As n increases, for any given θ the pi0 curve shifts down (see figure
1), since from eqation (2), ∂pi0∂n < 0.
20Note that if n=1, profit of the public bank is maximized at θ = 13 (see figure 1), which
is the same as obtained by Fershtman (1990).
21Note that this does not mean that the reservation profit alone always determines the
level of disinvestment. While this is true in the case of exogenous entry, in the case of
endogenously determined scale of entry which we analyse later, the level of disinvestment
is determined both by the reservation profit and the chosen scale of entry.
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The pi0 curve being concave, as it shifts down, its relevant intersection point
with p¯i0 moves to the left, leading to a lower θ
∗, i.e. higher disinvestment.
Proposition 2 For any given level of reservation profit p¯i0 (0 < p¯i0 < pi
M
0 ),
the maximum number of entrants and the corresponding degree of disinvest-
ment are as follows
n∗ =
R2
4bpi0
− 1 (4)
θ∗ =
n∗(n∗ + 2)
n∗2 + k2
, where k =
R2
bpi0
(5)
Proof : As the pi0 curve shifts down with rising n, beyond a particular
value of n, the pi0 curve falls below the reservation level, pi0, where the profit
constraint becomes untenable (see figure 1). Hence, the value of n for which
the pi0 is tangent to the pi0 line gives the maximum number of entrants to be
allowed by the government. This value for n can be obtained when equation
(3) has equal roots. In other words, k[k − 4(n + 1)]=0. Notice that, higher
reservation profit reduces this maximum scale of entry and increases the
corresponding level of disinvestment. It can be easily seen from equation (4)
∂n∗
∂p¯i0
< 0
Graphically in figure 1, as the p¯i0 line shifts up, its tangency with the pi0 curve
is reached much earlier for a lower n. Hence the maximum scale of entry is
less.
From equation (5)
∂θ∗
∂n∗
> 0
Hence, as the maximum number of entrants falls, the corresponding θ falls,
i.e. there is higher disinvestment.
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Proposition 3 A rise in reservation profit p¯i0 (0 < p¯i0 < pi
M
0 ) raises profit
of the private banks.
Proof : A rise in p¯i0 reduces θ and n which in turn increases pi1. This can
be seen from equation (2)
∂pi1
∂θ
< 0
∂pi1
∂n
< 0
Therefore, higher profit of the public bank does not cut into the profit of
the private banks which is unlike the Cournot result. This happens because
the chosen θ is on the falling part of the pi0 curve. Hence, as p¯i0 rises, θ
falls. As the public bank moves away from social maximizing behaviour,
its aggressiveness lessens and this helps the private banks to increase their
profit. Moreover, as p¯i0 rises, the maximum number of entrants falls and
thus, because of less competition, each private bank is now able to make
more profit.
Higher rate of return earned on deposits raises the maximum scale of
entry and increases the corresponding disinvestment. From equation (4)
∂n∗
∂R
> 0
From equation (5)
∂θ∗
∂n∗
> 0
Hence, as the maximum number of entrants falls, the corresponding θ falls,
i.e. there is higher disinvestment.
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4 Welfare Consequences of Entry
Entry has a complementary relation with disinvestment. However, entry per
se may not be desirable from the point of view of social welfare unless it
brings with it enhanced efficiency into the industry. In this section, we study
the impact of entry on social welfare.
Proposition 4 Entry reduces social welfare when all banks are equally effi-
cient.
Proof : Suppose,to the contrary of our claim, social welfare rises with
entry which is possible only ifD rises. This would mean either of the following
three cases happen, viz. D0 falls or remains unchanged or rises. When D
rises, r must be rising because of the positively sloped deposit supply curve.
Hence profit of the public bank, (R − r)D0 gets squeezed since R is fixed.
But pi0 has to satisfy the reservation profit of p¯i0 which rules out D0 falling
or remaining unchanged. The only other case left is that of D0 rising. From
equation (1) we know that when n rises and subsequently θ falls, D0 cannot
rise. Hence all the three cases are ruled out. Which means with entry, D
cannot rise. In fact, D would fall. Since ∂SW
∂D
> 0, social welfare falls. Hence
entry reduces social welfare.
Hence, there is no reason to deregulate entry at all. Monopoly of the pub-
lic bank seems to be the optimal situation from the welfare point of view.
The real culprit behind this result is the reservation profit of the government.
Explicit profit constraint of the incumbent works like an entry accommoda-
tion strategy by scaling down its deposits, so much so that total industry
deposits also declines. The reason is clear. As the incumbent must maintain
a fixed level of profit and the entrants also make profit in equilibrium, indus-
try deposits must contract and the social welfare will fall. Therefore, if the
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disinvestment authority had the power to regulate entry, it should allow none
to enter, and disinvest appropriately. This result also suggests that to enable
entry, the public bank has to take a hit in terms of profit. Hence, political
pressure to retain profitablity (manifested in the reservation profit) even after
disinvestment can actually be counterproductive. The moral of this exercise
is that entry in this environment is useless unless it brings some efficiency
gains. This finding is consistent with other models that have dealt with
privatization or disinvestment as well as some with empirical experiences.
We now consider the case where private banks earn a higher rate of return
on their investments than does the jointly owned bank, i.e. R1 > R0. This
is justifiable in many ways. One readily available argument can be found in
India’s long-standing policy of ‘priority sector lending’ (statutory lending to
relatively low-return sectors such as agriculture, small industries etc.), which
is mainly applied to public sector banks.22
Now the profit of bank i becomes
Πi = (Ri − r)Di
Substituting in the expression for SW
SW = R0D0 + nR1D1 − bD
2
2
The equilibrium deposits now are
D0 =
(1 + θ)[n(R0 −R1) +R0]
b[n(1− θ) + 2]
D1 =
2R1 − (1 + θ)R0
b[n(1− θ) + 2]
D =
n(1− θ)R1 + (1 + θ)R0
b[n(1− θ) + 2]
22Other justifications for this assumption could be better fund-management practices
of private banks, inefficiency of the public sector, poor debt recovery by public banks due
to political interference etc.
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Note that there is an upper bound on R1, since too high R0 could drive
D0 to zero.
23
Social welfare and pi0 are given as
SW =
A+B + C
2b[n(1− θ) + 2]2 ,
where, A = R20(1 + θ)[(3− θ)(1 + 2n) + 2n2(1− θ)]
B = nR21[8 + n(1− θ)(3 + θ)]
C = −2nR0R1(1 + θ)[(5− θ) + 2n(1− θ)]
pi0 =
(1− θ2)[R1 + n(R1 −R2)]2
b[n(1− θ) + 2]2
pi0 has the same shape as before. Social welfare is positively sloping in θ
as before provided R1 is not too high, since too high R1 has an adverse effect
on pi0.
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The objective of the government remains as before. The profit constraint
determines the level of disinvestment. The graphical solution is the same as
in figure 1. Intersection of pi0 and pi0 gives the equilibrium θ.
Mathematically, the solution is given by,
θ∗ =
n(n+ 2) +
√
k[k − 4(n+ 1)]
n2 + k
, where, k =
[R0 + n(R0 −R1)]2
bpi0
As before we choose the higher root since higher θ is preferred to lower θ
because of higher social welfare.
23
R1 −R0 < R0
n
24
R1 −R0 < (1− θ)[(3− θ) + n(1− θ)]
R0
n
19
Proposition 5 Entry increases social welfare when the potential entrants
are more efficient than the incumbent, provided the efficiency of the potential
entrants is within an upper bound.
Proof: We maximize social welfare simultaneously choosing n and θ, sub-
ject to the profit constraint. The Lagrangian for this problem is,
L = SW + λ(pi0 − p¯i0)
The optimal n and θ are given by the first order conditions
∂SW
∂θ
∂SW
∂n
=
∂pi0
∂θ
∂pi0
∂n
and,
pi0 = p¯i0
Solving, we get optimal n as
n∗ =
R0(1 + θ
∗)2 − 4R1θ∗
(1− θ∗)2(R1 −R0) ,
where θ∗ is given from equation (3). It can be easily shown that n∗ is posi-
tive25 which means that a positive value of the number of potential entrants
exists for which social welfare is maximum. However, R1 has an upper bound
as defined earlier, so as to make social welfare an increasing function of θ.
Therefore, we see that for a given level of reservation profit of the public
bank, social welfare declines with entry when all banks are equally efficient.
This is because the government’s reservation profit reduces the public bank’s
deposits and consequently the industry deposits. However, social welfare
25The other two values of n∗ obtained are R0R1−R0 and − 21−θ∗ . However, at the first value
of n∗, pi0=0. Therefore, the reservation profit is not attained and so this value is ruled
out. The second value of n∗ is negative and hence ruled out.
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improves with entry if the rate of return on investments of the private banks
is higher (but not too high). Here again, the profit constraint leads to a
decline in the industry deposits, but the loss in the depositor surplus is now
compensated by substantial profit gains of the private banks.
While the presence of the government with its social welfare maximizing
objective is essential to our story, it is worthwhile to mention that the exit of
the government does not unambiguously improve or reduce social welfare. It
can be easily shown that there is a range of values of R1 for the presence of
only private banks in the industry gives rise to a higher welfare as compared
to the mixed oligopoly case. If R1 is too low, the relative inefficiency of the
private banks leads to a lower social welfare than compared with the mixed
oligopoly case. On the other hand, if R1 is too high, it drives depositor
surplus down so that the social welfare is lower than compared with the
mixed oligopoly case.
5 Price Competition
In this section we provide an insight into choice of disivestment in the pres-
ence of product differentiation and price competition. This is relevant on
both empirical and theoretical grounds. With financial deregulation, banks
are expected to engage in product differentiation and interest rate competi-
tion. This is being observed in India and many other emerging economies.
26 Theoretically also, the implication of price competition for disinvestment
needs to be understood. Due to public ownership in a mixed oligopoly price
competition becomes much more intense, but it does not always improve
social welfare mainly because of the retaliatory feedbacks from rival prod-
26In India, banks are now free to choose interest rates on deposits with higher maturities.
21
ucts. To be more precise, assume two substitute products, one produced by
a partially public firm and the other by a private firm. With an increase in
the extent of public ownership in the first market, the social welfare in the
second market will surely fall, and in turn the price retaliation of the second
market will arrest and even may reverse the growth of the social welfare in
the first market. Thus, there is a need for optimal extent of public ownership,
or privatization.
We consider a similar setup as before with one public bank and only
one private bank 27, but the type of deposit account each offers is different
from the other’s. 28 Each chooses its own interest rate keeping in mind the
competing response of its rival.
Suppose the deposit supply functions are
D0 = A+ r0 − γr1 (6)
D1 = A+ r1 − γr0 (7)
where 0 ¡ γ ¡ 1.
The private bank’s objective is to choose r1 so as to maximize profit,
Π1 = (R− r1)D1, according to its reaction function (RF1):
r1 =
R− A+ γr0
2
.
As before, the private partner of the public firm is interested in its share
27We abstract from the question of entry.
28However, in practice, banks are seen to provide a wide range of deposits but they tend
to specialize on different types of deposits to reduce competition. For example, in India,
many newly permitted private banks offer overdraft facilities to savings deposit holders,
while a public bank does not offer such benefits. However, this does not construe a vertical
product differentiation because the private bank also requires a minimum balance which
is much larger than that required by a public bank. Here, however, for model simplicity
we restrict to the case where each bank offers only one type of deposit instead of a basket.
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of the profit, and the government in social welfare (profits plus depositors’
surplus). However, in the present case, social welfare can have two comopo-
nents, arising from the two markets. But for analytical simplicity we assume
that the government is mainly concnerned about the social welfare 29 of the
market in which the public bank operates, SW0 = Π0 +
D0
2
2
, given the prof-
itability constraint pi0 ≥ pi0.
As was earlier explained, the mixed ownership of the public bank leads
to its reaction function being a weighted average of R˜F and RF, where RF
is the reaction function from profit maximization
RF ∗0 = θ ˜RF0 + (1− θ)RF0 (8)
=
(1 + θ)R + (1− θ)(γr1 − A)
2
As in the quantity competition case, θ (0¡θ¡1) is the degree of national-
ization or government control which is positively linked to the proportion of
shares the government holds and (1− θ) is the degree of disinvestment.30.
To solve the game by backward induction, we first determine the equilib-
rium interest rates for a given θ. Solving the two reaction functions for the
interest rates, we get
r0 =
[2 + γ(1− θ)](R− A) + 2θ(R + A)
4− (1− θ)γ2
r1 =
[2 + γ](R− A) + γθ(R + A)
4− (1− θ)γ2
(9)
29It can be hypothesised that the governmetnt’s objectives may vary depending on the
level of operation. While at the level of the bank, the government representative on
the bank’s board is instructed to look after the welfare effects in his market alone, the
disinvestment authority may have a broader concern in terms of aggregate welfares. For
simplicity, we assume that the government’s objective remains the same at both levels,
and the insights we derive, as we show later, can be applied to the general case also.
30Note that R˜F : r0 = R and RF0 : r0 = R−A+γr12
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and equilibrium deposits as
D0 =
[2 + γ](1 + θ)[A+R(1− γ)]
4− (1− θ)γ2 (10)
D1 =
[2 + γ(1− θ)][A+R(1− γ)]
4− (1− θ)γ2 (11)
Comparing the above expressions, we observe that the public bank offers
a higher interest rate and mobilizes more deposits than the private bank (i.e.
D0 > D1, r0 > r1). This is because of the social welfare objective of the
government which takes into account depositors’ benefit. By putting θ = 0
we can verify that D0 = D1 and r0 = r1. This point is similar to the quanitity
competition case.
Next the equilibrium profits are,
pi0 =
(2 + γ)2[A+R(1− γ)]2(1− θ)(1 + θ)
2[4− (1− θ)γ2]2 (12)
pi1 =
[2 + γ(1− θ)]2[A+R(1− γ)]2
2[4− (1− θ)γ2]2
In contrast to the quantity competition case, the public bank does not
always make higher profit. It does so only if the government’s share in
ownership is below a critical level- i.e. θ < γ(2+γ)
γ(2+γ)+2
. When θ is sufficiently
high (above the critical level), the price reaction curve of the public firm shifts
out so much that the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium moves closer to the so-called
Stackelberg equilibrium with profit maximizing firms. To elaborate more, if
both bank 0 and 1, were (fully) privately owned, and bank 0 was a price
leader, then the resulting prices (which are the Stackelberg prices) would be
similar to that in the simultaneous move game that we are considering. That
θ causing a shift in the reaction funciton of the public bank is equivalent to
assigning a leadership role in the context of pure profit maximization. Then
by the standard result in industrial organization, price leader makes smaller
profit than the follower (Dowrick, 1986). With large θ this effect sets in.
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On the other hand, with smaller θ, the public bank is closer to the so-called
Cournot-Nash equilibrium, and by the observation of Fershtman (1990) we
know that the partially public firm makes more profit.
Now we arrive at the first stage of the game to determine optimal dis-
investment. With the help of equations (*)-(*), one can determine social
welfares in both the markets:
SW0 =
(2 + γ)2[A+R(1− γ)]2(3− θ)(1 + θ)
2[4− (1− θ)γ2]2
SW1 =
[2 + γ(1− θ)]2[A+R(1− γ)]2
2[4− (1− θ)γ2]2
The government’s objective is to maximize SW0 with respect to θ subject
to pi0geqpi0. Since it is a one-variable optimization problem, the solution must
be given by either the constraint or the objective function alone. Suppose θ˜
sets pi0(θ) as given in equation (9?) equal to pi0.
It can be checked that SW0 is a concave function of θ with a maximum
at θ = 1− γ2, whereas SW1 is falling all through in θ. Profits of both banks
fall with θ.31
The reason for obtaining a peak in the social welfare function (SW0) is
quite clear. When θ is low (say close to zero), private participation in the
public bank is substantial. Consequently, price is high and the depositor
31
∂SW0
∂θ
= −4(2 + γ)
2[A+R(1− γ)]2(1− θ − γ2)
[4− (1− θ)γ2]3 ⇒ θ = 1− γ
2
∂2SW0
∂θ2
= −4(2 + γ)
2[A+R(1− γ)]2[4 + 2γ2(1− θ)− 3γ4]
[4− (1− θ)γ2]4 < 0
∂SW1
∂θ
= −6γ(2 + γ)[A+R(1− γ)]
2[2 + γ(1− θ)]2
[4− (1− θ)γ2]3
∂pi0
∂θ
= −2(2 + γ)
2[A+R(1− γ)]2[4θ + (1− θ)γ2]
[4− (1− θ)γ2]3 < 0
∂pi1
∂θ
= −4γ(2 + γ)[A+R(1− γ)]
2[2 + γ(1− θ)]
[4− (1− θ)γ2]3 < 0
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surplus is moderate. As θ increases, profit falls, depositr surplus increases.
But at low θ, the increase in the depositor surplus dominates the fall in
profit. Thus the social welfare increaes. This continues up to θ = 1 − γ2.
Beyond this, the increase in the depositor surplus begins to abate and gets
outweighed by the fall in profit, which leads to an overall decline in social
welfare.
This discussion helps us to conclude that the optimal θ is given by
minimum[θ˜, 1− γ2]. The graphical solution is given in figure (2).
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Figure 2: Price Competition
 
        
 
  
 Q 
  
 
 
 
 SW1 
  
 
 
  
   
 
                    R   
  0p  
  
                    0p  
 
 
  
                              
21 g-       *q                       1                          q  
           
  
  
  
27
To summarize, we arrive at the following proposition.
Proposition 6 (a) Deposits and interest rate of the public bank are higher
than that of the private bank. However, profit of the public bank is lower
(greater) than that of the private bank, if θ > (<) γ(2+γ)
γ(2+γ)+2
.
(b) Optimal disinvestment is given by θ = minimum[θ˜, 1− γ2]
It is worthwhile to note that when γ is relatively small, the optimal
disinvestment is likely to be given by θ˜ (rather than 1− γ2). The outcome is
qualitatively similar to the homogeneous product and quantity competition
case as discussed in section 3. But if γ is sufficiently high (i.e. the products
being closer substitutes), the social welfare function reaches its peak much
earlier, largely because of the feedback effect of the rival’s interest rate, which
is a strategic compelement. Consequently, a greater degree of disinvestment is
chosen which gives rise to profit of the public bank in excess of the reservation
level.32
Thus we see that the profitability constraint is not the all important deter-
minant for disinvestment. Social welfare considerations are also important,
particularly when the products are closer substitutes. It can also be argued
that in the framework of product differentiation and price competition, the
degree of disinvestment is likely to be higher and more so if the disinvestment
authority were concerned with the welfare in the second market as well33
Social welfare in the second market always falls in θ, hence when it is
included in the government’s objective function, disinvestment will be even
32Check that if γ = 0 in equation (*), SW0 would be an increasing function, and SW2
would be unaffected by θ. Therefore, γ > 0 plays a crucial role in determining the shape
of the social welfare function, and consequently optimal disinvestment.
33This is evident from the fact that SW1 is a declining function of θ. So if an optimal
θ ≥ 0 exists, it must be less than (1− γ2).
28
more. The earlier the rise of the social welfare function is arrested, greater
is the disivestment. In the quantity competition case, the social welfare
function was always rising in θ. Hence the optimal disinvestment would be
less. In other words, price competition would lead to greater disinvestment.
6 Conclusion
This paper provides a theoretical view of the complementarity of disinvest-
ment and entry deregulation in the banking industry. We study a ’mixed
oligopoly’ involving a partly disinvested public bank and n private banks
competing for deposits. We show that when entry is exogenously given,
while a larger scale of entry is associated with a higher degree of disinves-
ment, there is an upper bound on the scale of entry and consequently the
degree of disinvestment that can be allowed by the government. However,
we find that entry deregulation along with disinvestment is the best policy
for the government from the point of view of social welfare only when private
banks are more efficient than the public bank. Finally, we study the case of
price competition.
We do not discuss the economic reasons behind the initial decision to
disinvest which could be a political decision taken by the government. The
government might want to disassociate itself from business and facilitate the
entry of market forces in the industry. Our point of inquiry is the strategic
role of disinvestment and entry deregulation once the initial decision to dis-
invest has been taken by the government. Moreover, we do not study the
competition for loans which is the other function of a bank. Asymmetric
information can be introduced and the deposit supply function can be gen-
eralized. Future research could consist of extending our model in the above
29
directions.
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